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A.I.D. STRATEGY

AFGHAN RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION

**Office of the A.I.D. Representative
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 15, 1988, Soviet troops began their withdrawal from Afghanistan. They leave behind a proud and brave people who have suffered immeasurably for the cause of freedom. Between 1 million to 2.5 million Afghans have been killed. Unknown numbers have been maimed. As many as eight million have been forced to flee their villages for food, shelter, and safety in foreign countries or regime controlled cities. Altogether, as much as half of Afghanistan's pre-war population has been killed, wounded, or driven from home.

The U.S. Government is committed to helping the Afghan people recover from nearly ten long years of foreign occupation, deprivation, and war. Yet, the magnitude of the problem is such that no single country alone can provide the resources required to meet the challenges of resettlement and rehabilitation that lie ahead. The enormous need for assistance calls for an international response to which the United Nations must provide financial and technical leadership.

The U.S. Government supports the U.N. effort and has pledged to help with advice, expertise and finance. The U.S.G.'s most important resource in assisting the U.N. and others will be the experience gained and the relationships and systems established under the A.I.D. Humanitarian Assistance Program. The program began in 1985 and has grown exponentially since then. It provides food; medicine, medical equipment and training; educational materials and training; and technical advice and equipment to increase agricultural production.

The success of the program is attributed to an early decision to work with Afghan technical entities set up under the auspices of the resistance Alliance. Establishing and constantly striving to increase the Afghan character of the program has had several benefits. It has extended the reach of assistance beyond that which the existing expatriate PVOs could provide; enabled the resistance to deliver some of the basic goods and services typical of a civil government; and, consequently, positioned the resistance to act as an alternative to the communist regime. Moreover, it has given Afghans experience in program planning and implementation that will be invaluable in the years ahead.

The A.I.D. program and the Afghan entities created under the program can, if properly nurtured, make a tremendous contribution to the international resettlement and rehabilitation effort. The immediate priority of A.I.D. will be the successful resettlement of refugees and displaced persons--specifically, ensuring that conditions inside Afghanistan are such that returnees are able to sustain themselves and avoid refoulement. This will mean cooperating with the U.N., the GOP and other donors to provide food, shelter, clothing and other relief assistance to those most in need.

Yet, to focus exclusively on the provision of relief assistance in the regions of heaviest resettlement would be a mistake that the international community would regret all too soon. Experience over the past several decades with other, less complex resettlements clearly demonstrates that relief assistance cannot be provided in the absence of activities designed to reduce the period of dependency on donor support.

Given A.I.D.'s experience as the only donor with a significant cross border program and the Afghan character of the program that has been developed, the U.S. Government has a clear comparative advantage in supporting activities that will help Afghanistan return to normalcy. In sum, A.I.D. proposes to:

- do all that it reasonably can to ensure the readiness of the U.N. agencies and others (within existing financial and staffing constraints and without compromising statutory responsibilities for managing A.I.D.'s on-going program) by sharing experience; seeking to improve U.N. relationships with the Alliance and the GOP; and cooperating with the U.N. and others to establish relief delivery mechanisms.
- stand ready to help fill critical commodity gaps that the U.N. agencies or others cannot easily or quickly meet.
- make resettlement a priority while providing support to activities that will reduce the period of Afghan dependency on outside relief and lay the groundwork for the longer-term reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The successful and sustained resettlement of millions of Afghans is a formidable undertaking. Obstacles are certain to be numerous, difficult, and varied. They can be addressed but the cooperation and participation of all those who have demonstrated interest in the restoration of a peaceful, self-reliant, non-aligned and unified Afghan nation will be essential. This includes not only the U.S. Government and the United Nations; it also includes the Government of Pakistan, the PVOs, and other bilateral donors, such as Saudi Arabia. Most of all it includes the Afghans. The Afghans are the ones with the greatest stake in the resettlement and rehabilitation effort and they cannot be excluded from its planning and execution.

II. Background

A. Introduction

Nearly ten years of war have had a devastating effect on the society and economy of Afghanistan. Five million people have fled the country to settle as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Another two million have abandoned their villages for more secure areas within Afghanistan, either in the regime-controlled cities or rural areas removed from military conflict. The estimates of Afghan dead run from 1 million to 2.5 million people. In addition to those killed, many have been injured, maimed or crippled, and there are countless widows and orphans with no real means of livelihood. Property damage cannot be calculated but is known to be enormous. The destabilizing psychological effects on the Afghan people of so much death and destruction will require a generation or more to expunge from the national psyche.

Agricultural production has declined to a level estimated to be as low as fifty percent of the pre-war level. Declines are attributed to labor shortages; the neglect and destruction of irrigation systems, wheat fields and orchards; the widespread loss of draft animals; and the lack of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and insecticides.

Rural health care delivery systems, which were limited before the war, are now virtually non-existent. Recent UNICEF data indicate that Afghanistan has the highest infant mortality rate in the world. Moreover, life expectancy at birth is only 39 years, compared to 59 years in neighboring Iran.

The education system is yet another victim. Pre-war statistics indicated a minimum twelve percent literacy rate for both men and women. This has worsened because the vast majority of young people have received no education over the past ten years. That which has occurred has been of marginal quality, conducted with limited human and material resources. Higher education barely exists. Typical is Kabul University where the engineering and agriculture laboratories have been stripped and most of the trained staff have fled to the west.

The resettlement of the millions of refugees and displaced persons and the reconstruction of the Afghan nation will require massive amounts of assistance—capital, technical, and managerial. The strategy describes the U.S. Government approach to humanitarian assistance during the resettlement and rehabilitation period, anticipating only the next eighteen to twenty four months. It could have a shorter life or a longer one depending on the evolution of the Afghan situation. As in the past, the ability to respond quickly and appropriately to rapidly unfolding events will be critical to success. Flexibility must remain the hallmark of all activities.

Initially, the program will be operated out of Pakistan without the cooperation of a central government in Kabul. During the course of the transition period, the Mission may transfer in whole or in part to Kabul depending on political-military events inside Afghanistan and U.S. policy formulated in response to those events. Near the end of the transitional period, a new strategy will be developed for the post-Soviet period.

Since the transitional strategy emanates from experience gained under the bilateral cross border program, it is useful to start with a brief description of it.

B. Program Description

The Cross Border Humanitarian Assistance Program for Afghanistan was initiated in 1985 with \$8 million of reprogrammed funds. As a result of strong Administration and bipartisan Congressional support, it has expanded rapidly, totaling some \$72 million in appropriated funds in FY 88. Uncounted is the value of the hundreds of tons of donated materiel which the Office of the A.I.D. Representative manages each year.

In 1987, European private voluntary organizations (PVOs) were the only channels available to A.I.D. for reaching Afghans inside Afghanistan. The program relied exclusively on PVOs during the first year of implementation and continues to provide significant support to them today. Grant recipients now include American as well as European organizations. In FY 1988, \$9.6 million was awarded to PVOs through two projects. One project primarily supports health activities; the other helps Afghans with cash grants for the purchase of food and other commodities critical to survival; with technical and commodity assistance to increase the production of food; and with resettlement assistance.

In early 1986, the seven resistance parties of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (IUMJ or Alliance) began to organize themselves to channel humanitarian goods and services to Afghans living in liberated regions and the U.S. Government made a policy decision to directly assist the Alliance in its endeavors. Through the Alliance, A.I.D. encouraged and supported the development of an Afghan capacity to plan and execute humanitarian assistance programs. This approach serves the long term U.S. Government objective of establishing a self-governing, non-aligned Afghanistan, and, by using Afghan delivery mechanisms, enables A.I.D. to extend and multiply programs far beyond what the expatriate PVOs could accomplish (there are no indigenous PVOs). With the help of U.S. technical assistance teams, viable Afghan institutions and operating systems have been created for education, health and agriculture. Goods and services are being delivered to liberated areas in Afghanistan by these institutions and planning and policy-making capabilities are steadily improving. Under a separate arrangement, A.I.D. is channeling commodity support (including food aid) through the respective Alliance political parties.

As could be expected, the conditions of war have imposed severe constraints on traditional modes of implementation. Restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens inside Afghanistan and to sensitive border areas of Pakistan have impeded A.I.D.'s ability to monitor resources and to evaluate program impact. Also, the Government of Pakistan has requested that public information about the program be limited in order to help it avoid an unnecessary limelight on the GOP's role and to minimize security risks to program participants.

...as the U.N. and other programs become publicized and Soviet and SA forces lose control of more territory.) Finally, the Government of Pakistan has insisted on its direct involvement, through a non-traditional counterpart organization, in both policy-making and program operations.

C. Geneva Accords

The Geneva Accords were signed on April 14, 1988, and went into effect May 15. They provide for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops, potentially paving the way for one of the largest human migrations since World War II. Fifty percent of the troops were withdrawn by August 15, with the balance due out no later than February 15, 1989. The latter date could be a watershed for all humanitarian programs since it symbolizes a point at which planners can realistically foresee a significant return of refugees -- weather, mines, and key military and political factors permitting.

Upon the signing of the Geneva Accords, the U.S. Government announced its support for a U.N.-led resettlement effort and encouraged the appointment of a United Nations "Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs for Afghanistan" to organize and coordinate the resettlement. U.S. Government support for a U.N.-led resettlement is driven by a number of factors:

- no single donor (and certainly not the U.S.G.) can absorb the costs at the high levels of funding believed necessary -- a U.N. umbrella seems the only way to attract major funds over an extended period from a variety of donors;
- the absence of a legitimate Afghan government or any other entity in Kabul equipped to serve as the coordinator of donor assistance; and,
- the political importance for intra-Afghan and broader foreign policy reasons to maintain a non-obtrusive U.S. Government profile.

The U.N. has sought to quickly mobilize donor resources. Donors pledged \$96.765 million at a June 14, 1988, meeting and an additional \$795.5 million at the October 12, 1988, pledging conference.

Combined pledges now total \$892.267 million, representing almost 77 percent of the \$1.16 billion which the U.N. has estimated as the cost of an 18-month resettlement and recovery program. The Soviets pledged an estimated \$600 million of the total. The entire package has not yet been analyzed by the U.N. for its overall responsiveness to projected needs.

At the October 12 pledging conference, the U.S. Government committed itself to providing "advice, expertise, and finance" to the U.N. and will do so provided the U.N. program is structured and managed to prevent the manipulation of assistance in favor of a government that is neither legitimate nor representative of the Afghan people.

A.I.D. will be crucial to the U.S. Government policy of supporting the U.N. Based on wide experience as the only donor with a program of significant cross border assistance to liberated areas of Afghanistan, A.I.D. will provide advice to the U.N. and others for both the planning and implementation of the resettlement and rehabilitation program. A.I.D. will, in addition, support and complement the activities of the U.N. and, to the extent funds permit, help fill critical gaps that the U.N. agencies cannot easily or quickly meet.

III. A.I.D. During the Transition Period

A. Program Objectives

The A.I.D. program was created to minimize the suffering of Afghans who were unwilling or unable to flee their villages for the safety of Pakistan, third countries, or the cities of Afghanistan. It was, of course, not lost on program advocates that the provision of humanitarian assistance would also help to strengthen the resolve and the capability of the Afghan people to support the cause of the resistance. Thus, a program was designed with both humanitarian and foreign policy objectives in mind.

The convergence of humanitarian and foreign policy objectives is not new to A.I.D. programs for Afghanistan. As the Retrospective Review of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan - 1950-1979 points out "... for over two decades, from 1955 to 1979, the U.S. assistance program to Afghanistan had the overriding political objective of influencing Afghan Government leaders to maintain a non-aligned status.... Among

US and Soviet programs, Afghanistan was unique in the intensity of the East-West political competition.

With the signing of the Geneva Accords, the U.S. Government has expanded its current objectives in Afghanistan. While minimizing the suffering of Afghans living in the liberated regions will remain highly relevant, the U.S. Government will also seek to contribute to the successful resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Supporting the cause of the Afghan resistance will be important as long as a communist government sits in Kabul; but with the anticipated collapse of that government, increasing attention will be focused on facilitating the emergence of a politically stable Afghanistan with a government that is determined by and acceptable to a majority of the people of the country.

To understand the rationale of the transition strategy, it is important to understand the relationship between the humanitarian and the foreign policy aspects of the program. Program content is wholly humanitarian; however, U.S. foreign policy objectives play a decisive role in implementation decisions. An obvious example is the selection of delivery mechanisms. The greatest portion of A.I.D.-financed goods and services has been delivered to targetted beneficiaries by the seven parties of the Alliance or by technical committees set up with A.I.D. assistance under the auspices of the Alliance. By developing the capability of the resistance, A.I.D. has enabled it to act as an alternative to the communist regime and increased its credibility among the Afghan people. In essence, the A.I.D. program has helped the resistance to become more than just a military cum religious entity (jihad). It now has a political dimension with a capability to perform some of the most basic functions of a civil government, i.e., the delivery of public goods and services.

During the resettlement and rehabilitation period, foreign policy objectives will continue to influence the manner in which humanitarian objectives are pursued. As discussed later, foreign policy objectives might lead A.I.D. to implement a number of activities beyond the resettlement regions and to deal more actively with local authorities. Foreign policy objectives will also affect the composition and mix of A.I.D. activities.

II. Resettlement and Rehabilitation Strategy Overview

The primary focus during the resettlement and rehabilitation period will be to help ensure that conditions inside Afghanistan are such that the existing and returning populations are able to sustain themselves. This will mean cooperating with the U.N. and other donors to ensure that the short-term needs of food, shelter, and clothing can be met.

In an ideal situation, the U.N. would require minimal, if any, A.I.D. assistance in meeting immediate resettlement needs; but given the enormous scale of the Afghan resettlement, the complex political and military environment, and A.I.D.'s role as the only donor with a significant program of cross border assistance, A.I.D. has made it a priority to support and complement the U.N. relief effort.

However, if sustained resettlement is to be accomplished, the provision of relief assistance must be designed so as to avoid retarding self-help and local commercial and agricultural development. Similarly, relief assistance cannot be provided in the absence of activities that will reduce the period of the recipients' dependency on such assistance. To the extent U.S. Government resources and U.N. resettlement capabilities permit, A.I.D. intends to support activities that will facilitate the transition from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

It is necessary to look beyond relief requirements for several reasons. First, after the initial year or so of resettlement, it will become increasingly difficult to attract donor resources at the levels necessary to maintain relief-type assistance. At that point, Afghans must be positioned to sustain themselves. Second, refugees and displaced persons who have taken a "wait and see" attitude may be reluctant to leave the camps and cities without reasonable assurances that long-term sustainability is possible. In fact, if sustainability activities are seen by Afghans to be neglected, it could trigger a refoulement of refugees and displaced persons. This is a scenario which would jolt the donor community as well as create domestic political problems for Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Iran, countries which have hosted large numbers of refugees for many years at great cost. Finally, the stability of any popularly

selected government is dependent on the country moving as quickly as possible from a state of relief to a state of economic normalcy.

A.I.D. has a number of activities that are already contributing to reducing the dependency of the Afghans on outside assistance, such as the rehabilitation of irrigation channels and farm-to-market roads under the Agriculture Sector Support Project. It would be a mistake to choke these activities or in any way dismantle the institutions and systems that make them possible.

An issue has been the extent to which A.I.D. should engage in institutional development. This is a definitional problem. In speaking of the technical committees, the program does not use the word "institutions" in the sense a political scientist would--or even in the sense a practitioner of third world development would. What has been created are organizations that, with outside technical assistance, have been able to act as counterparts to A.I.D. In large part, the success of the A.I.D. program can be attributed to the early decision to establish, develop, and work with the Afghan technical committees. The success of resettlement and rehabilitation will likewise be dependent on the continued willingness and ability of A.I.D. and other donors to "Afghanize" the effort--outsiders cannot do it all; nor will Afghans allow them to do so.

The value of the technical committees should be measured not only by the activities they have planned and implemented with A.I.D. support but also by how their capabilities are perceived by others. They have been judged by DOD officials unassociated with the program as capable of turning mine awareness information into effective, culturally-sensitive instructional materials which the committees, along with other organizations, will use and disseminate throughout the country. UNICEF is working with the Alliance Health Committee to support immunization activities under the A.I.D. Health Sector Support Project and the UNDP is discussing the possibility of supporting activities through the A.I.D.-financed Afghan rural works organization. Finally, the Alliance and the interim government frequently turn to individuals on the committees for technical advice.

Thus, A.I.D. is practicing institutional development at its most basic level. The institutions that A.I.D. is working with may not

not in their present form but there are elements of those institutions that may well be sustainable and able to make an important contribution during the transition period and thereafter. Consequently, A.I.D. will not abandon its institutional development efforts but will take steps to ensure that what is done is directly relevant to resettlement and rehabilitation.

C. The Bilateral Program

1. Program Priorities

It is difficult to set sectoral priorities for Afghan resettlement and rehabilitation because of the weak data base from which the donors must proceed, and the complexity and magnitude of the problems that lie ahead. For instance, food security is always identified as a high priority and yet experience indicates, that in other similar cases, more people die of diarrhea than of starvation in resettlement exercises. The delivery of shelter materials and agricultural inputs such as seed is also considered a high priority, but neither food, shelter, agricultural inputs, nor other commodities can be delivered in a timely manner unless there is a dedicated effort to deliver such commodities and a serviceable network of primary and secondary roads. And, in Afghanistan, the integrity of the road network cannot be fully addressed in the absence of a de-mining effort. Consequently, donors will need to concentrate significant human and commodity resources on a number of different fronts at the same time. A.I.D. priorities will include cooperating with the World Food Program (WFP) on food security, getting the agricultural sector on its feet, providing support for immunization and control of diarrheal diseases, and strengthening the resettlement related capabilities of the recently formed Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit. A.I.D. will also maintain the primary schools already established under the Education Sector Support Project, recognizing that this nationwide network of teachers and administrators is a highly visible political indicator of the resistance's ability to perform the functions of a civil government.

2. Project Portfolio

The portfolio can be broken into three tiers. The first tier includes those activities which are directly related to the immediate

resettlement needs; the second includes activities that reduce the period of Afghan dependency on donor support; and the final tier includes activities that address serious problems requiring longer term solutions. A.I.D. will be active in all three tiers but the extent to which it is able to support activities in the second and third tiers will be related to the ability of A.I.D., the U.N., and other donors to adequately respond to first tier needs. The successful implementation of this strategy will require flexibility and careful planning. The planning will occur during the project assessment/redesign process that should be completed by January, 1989.

The following paragraphs indicate the activities A.I.D. will undertake within each of the tiers.

Tier One

The highest priorities will be food security and agricultural development. The current food and agriculture strategy consists of four activities. For the nearby food deficit provinces, A.I.D. provides bulk wheat through the PL 480 Title II emergency feeding program. For more distant provinces that are still within a reasonable logistical reach, compact food packs which feed four adults for one week have been developed and are procured and delivered under the Commodity Export Program. For distant provinces where resupply is difficult or impossible, the Rural Assistance Project provides "cash-for-food" as a means of pulling food and other resources into resistance-controlled communities. Finally, agricultural development activities, especially irrigation, have been and will continue to be undertaken through the Agricultural Sector Support Project and the Rural Assistance Project in areas where opportunities to enhance agricultural production present themselves. A.I.D. will continue each of these four activities during the resettlement and rehabilitation period, although the nature of the activities may change as circumstances evolve. The PL 480 Title II program, for instance, will shift its focus from the free food distribution program now in place to a CARE-managed food for work program.

It is difficult to prioritize the remaining tier one activities because they are all critical to a successful resettlement effort.

four activities under the Commodity Export Program are in the first tier: the procurement of commodities, such as food and clothing; the soon to be developed program to use dogs in the detection of mines; support to the recently established Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU); and the recently approved studies component. The ACLU focuses on the enormous logistical problems associated with returning refugees and delivering commodities over a road and bridge system that has been destroyed or neglected throughout the war. The studies component will provide valuable information to help A.I.D., the U.N. and other donors make informed decisions concerning on-going and possible new areas of assistance.

Immunization and the control of diarrheal diseases, activities already being implemented under the Health Sector Support Project, are also in the first tier. Immunization is the responsibility of the Preventive Medicine Division of the Alliance Health Committee (AHC). Activities to control diarrheal diseases are supported through the basic health posts and clinics of the AHC's health care pyramid.

Tier Two

Tier two, as mentioned above, consists of activities that will reduce the period during which Afghans are dependent on relief assistance. The activities in this category have yet to be designed and all but one of them are in the agricultural sector. A.I.D. plans to implement a small Commodity Import Program (CIP), and a seed development activity, both probably as components of the Agriculture Sector Support Project. A PL 480 Title II Section 206 Sales Program will also be considered. The CIP will be used to stimulate the existing but stunted private sector to import and sell agricultural tools, seed, irrigation pumps, and possibly tractors and fertilizer. (A small but highly successful experimental activity to distribute agricultural equipment through the private sector has already been undertaken.) Both the CIP and the Section 206 Sales Program will generate local currency that can be used to cover urgent and expanding local cost requirements. The CIP, in addition, will help to reorient trade away from the increasingly Soviet influenced patterns of the last 10 years.

The one non-agriculture activity under tier two is a management training effort that will be implemented under the Education Sector Support Project. Through the project, Afghans will be taught basic skills in areas such as bookkeeping, procurement and logistics so that they can assume many of the responsibilities held by donor staff in resettlement and rehabilitation activities.

Tier Three

Tier three consists of activities that will address serious problems requiring longer-term solutions. These activities should not be viewed with any less importance than activities in tiers one and two. For instance, interventions to discourage the cultivation of narcotics will require early attention given the potential political ramifications of letting the problem go unaddressed.

The scholarship program, which is important to the development of future leaders and donor counterparts, cannot be easily delayed without consequences that will be felt all too soon. Similarly, primary and secondary school education cannot be neglected. While the primary school network created under the Education Sector Support Project will be held to a near maintenance level, textbooks developed for the network will be distributed in the refugee camps under the redesigned Education Sector Support Project in order to facilitate national integration.

3. Site Selection Determinants

In the selection of project sites, a number of variables will be considered. During the resettlement and rehabilitation period, the bulk of A.I.D. support will be channeled to those areas to which the heaviest inflow of refugees and displaced persons is expected as well as to the maintenance of on-going activities. However, geographical proximity to regions of resettlement will not be the sole determinant of site selection. A.I.D. will, in addition, want to take advantage of targets of opportunity. Certain local authorities may have organized administrative networks that will lead to an investment to impact ratio not possible elsewhere. U.S. foreign policy objectives will also be a factor in the selection of project sites. In order to sustain the momentum of the resistance, A.I.D. will continue to provide support to newly liberated areas which are in need of

humanitarian assistance. Sometimes these areas may coincide with areas to which large numbers of refugees and displaced persons will return. Sometimes they may not.

A.I.D. and other donors must be wary of creating regional disparities in the distribution of assistance. Focus on the border provinces to the virtual exclusion of more distant ones could exacerbate internal tensions and threaten what is likely to be, in the best of scenarios, a fragile national stability. This problem has ethnic as well as geographic elements.

The charts on the following pages indicate the phases of repatriation on a regional basis as anticipated by the UNHCR; the numbers of refugees in Pakistan from each region of Afghanistan; the estimated existing populations in each region; and the numbers and categories of A.I.D. activities in each region. The charts assume that refugees will generally go back to the regions from which they came. Since they include only the refugees returning from Pakistan and do not include those who will be returning from Iran and Afghan cities, the charts reflect less than half of the number of Afghans who could be returning to their homes. Illustratively, the 435,000 listed for the Northwest provinces of Farah, Ghor, and Herat would swell significantly if we were able to estimate the number of refugees returning from Iran.

The charts have been included for two reasons: to show that large numbers of refugees will be returning to almost every province of Afghanistan, and that A.I.D. activities are currently balanced in favor of those provinces in which the earliest and heaviest resettlement is expected to take place (see Phase 1 chart).

TABLE 1

A.I.D. Project Sites in Phase I Resettlement Regions¹

Region	Population-- expected to return from Pakistan/ currently in Afghanistan ² (millions)	Irrigation karezes-- Complete/ Under Rehab.	Area Agri Dev Schemes ³	Clinics	Health Posts	Primary Schools (verified) ⁴
<u>East</u> Kunar Lashman Nangarhar Paktiya	1.2 / 1.5			9	154	134
<u>East Central</u> Ghazni Logar Wardak	0.7 / 0.94	23/143 (0/60) (0/70) (33/13)	5 (2) (2) (1)	11	165	168
<u>South</u> Helmand Kandahar Nimroz Paktika Zabul	1.0 / 0.94	20/29 (0/10) (20/19)	3 (2) (1)	5	70	2
<u>Northwest</u> Farah Ghor Herat	0.4 / 0.92			10	42	5
Total	3.3 / 4.3	53/172	8 Schemes	35	431	309

See page 18 for footnotes.

TABLE 2

A.I.D. Project Sites in Phase II Resettlement Regions¹

Region	Population-- expected to return from Pakistan/ currently in Afghanistan ² (millions)	Irrigation Karezes-- Complete/ Under Rehab.	Area Agri Dev Schemes ³	Clinics	Health Posts	Primary Schools (verified) ⁴
<u>East Central</u> Kanduyan Kapisa	N/A / 0.2			0	35	54
<u>South</u> Lurugan	0.05 / 0.3			2	13	0
<u>Northwest</u> Badghis	0.04/ 0.2			2	11	0
<u>Northeast</u> Badakshan Takhar	0.03/ 0.6		1 (1)	6	43	66
Total	0.12 / 1.3	0	1 Scheme	10	102	120

See page 19 for footnotes.

TABLE 3

A.I.D. Project Sites in Phase III Resettlement Regions¹

Region	Population-- expected to return from Pakistan/ currently in Afghanistan ² (millions)	Irrigation karezes-- Complete/ Under Rehab.	Area Agri Dev Schemes ³	Clinics	Health Posts	Primary Schools (verified) ⁴
<u>Central</u>	0.1 / 1.5		1	4	87	69
kabul						
Parwan			(1)			
<u>Northeast</u>	0.2 / 0.5		1	7	61	62
Baglan			(1)			
kunduz						
<u>North</u>	0.03/ 1.3			6	125	84
Balkh						
Fartab						
Jowzjan						
Samangan						
Total	0.33/ 3.3		2 Schemes	17	273	215

See page 19 for footnotes.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Resettlement information is based on a table found on page 21 of the Preliminary Report on Conditions Affecting the Repatriation of Afghan Refugees, a document prepared by Dr. Richard English for the UNHCR. The phases were determined by the pattern of Soviet withdrawal and the openings of regions to reasonably secure movement.
- 2 Information from inside Afghanistan is difficult to collect and is not consistently accurate. These figures, which were provided by Management Sciences for Health, were obtained using figures from the 1973-74 Afghan Demographic Survey Studies as a base and assuming a 2.2% rate of natural increase per annum. Deductions were then made for war-related deaths and for refugees who left Afghanistan. Pre-war nomad population estimates of 1.1 million to 2.4 million have not been included in the calculations.
- 3 Area development schemes have resident field staff in place to provide agricultural inputs and services in collaboration with local councils (shuras). The area covered is usually one district of a province.
- 4 All provinces have not yet been visited for verification. Altogether A.I.D. is supporting 1610 schools attended by approximately 87,000 students.

I. Implementation Mechanisms

a. The Resistance

A.I.D. has been working through institutions established under Alliance auspices to implement education and health activities and has involved the Alliance in activities related to agriculture and rural works. A.I.D. has also established direct relationships with selected regional commanders with the knowledge of the governing Alliance committees. During both resettlement and rehabilitation, the preference will be to work through the Alliance or its successor(s) so as to avoid contributing to the political fragmentation of Afghanistan. However, broader local arrangements such as shuras (local administrative councils) are forming in several liberated areas and offer increasing opportunities for donor involvement. In those instances in which it serves U.S. Government interests, A.I.D. will maintain the flexibility to work with shuras, commanders and other local authorities. In working with local and regional authorities, the long-term objective will be to strengthen regional-central relationships while developing their capabilities to manage humanitarian assistance.

b. Private Voluntary Organizations

A.I.D. will continue to provide assistance through PVOs during resettlement and rehabilitation but increasingly it will shift its resources from European to U.S. PVOs. European governments are being encouraged to increase their contributions to the PVOs of their respective countries so that A.I.D. funding to non-U.S. PVOs can decrease. Soft demarches to appropriate European embassies in Islamabad and to their PVOs in Peshawar have already begun.

D. A.I.D. Support to the U.N.

1. U.S. Government Policy Toward the U.N. and Other Donors

The U.S. Government supports a U.N.-led multilateral resettlement and reconstruction effort and, to the extent that U.S. and U.N. interests coincide, will work closely with the U.N. agencies to ensure that their planning is comprehensive, cost-effective, and logistically and financially realistic. The U.S. Government recognizes that the U.N.

and subsequently the World Bank could become the dominant donor for some of the activities now financed by the U.S. Government. Consequently, it is in our interest to cooperate closely with the multilateral agencies in order to influence and help shape their long term programs.

A.I.D. still in a phase in which the focus of support for Afghanistan is in resistance-held areas where assistance is being provided in the absence of an acceptable national government. The U.S. bilateral program has the capability to operate in this environment and will do all possible to assist the U.N. to initiate programs in this unconventional situation. Simultaneously, the U.S. Government will seek to limit the provision of U.N. assistance through a Kabul government which does not enjoy the support of the majority of people. U.N. support which is provided to regime-controlled areas should be of a relief nature only and provided directly to the people by the U.N. or through neutral private voluntary agencies in such a way that the recipients are unambiguously aware of its non-regime origins.

2. U.N. Overview

The U.N. specialized agencies will constitute the largest donor effort during the resettlement period. Therefore, it is essential that the programs of the various U.N. agencies be thoughtfully planned and well executed. To ensure that the U.N. effort is a coordinated one and that U.N. resources are used to maximum effectiveness, the Secretary General has appointed a "Coordinator for U.N. Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Program for Afghanistan." While the Coordinator has been successful in focusing the attention of the donor community on the tremendous challenges that lie ahead, he has had serious problems on several other crucial fronts. Problems are to be expected given the enormity and complexity of the resettlement; however, there are four that must be dealt with immediately and effectively lest they jeopardize the success of the resettlement and rehabilitation effort.

The first and perhaps most serious problem is the relationship between the U.N. and the Alliance. The U.N. is reluctant to view the Alliance as a counterpart because of its desire to remain apolitical and because of the Alliance's recognized administrative weaknesses.

The Alliance, on the other hand, resents the relationship the U.N. has maintained with the Kabul regime throughout the war and the fact that it was excluded, unlike the regime, from participating in the U.N.-hosted Geneva negotiations. Given the Government of Pakistan's support for the Alliance, GOP control over access into the country, and the Alliance's extensive ability to thwart any U.N. activities in Afghanistan, the U.N. would be well served to come to workable terms with the Alliance.

The second problem is directly related to the first. The U.N. is currently planning to rely heavily on expatriates for the delivery of goods and services. Very little participation is being sought from the Afghans, the people who have the greatest stake in a successful resettlement. In the immediate term, reliance on expatriate "experts" and the lack of Afghan input will result in a seriously flawed program. In both the near-and longer-term, it will lengthen the recovery period by smothering the initiative of the Afghan people. A lengthened recovery period could create enormous problems particularly if, as a result of another, newer world-class crisis, donor interest begins to wane.

The third problem is that the Coordinator has yet to establish an effective office in Pakistan. Although senior representatives of the Coordinator have been assigned to the office, none has been here on a full time basis and they do not have the staff or the resources to operate effectively. More than three million Afghan refugees are in Pakistan. Moreover, the Alliance administration is in Pakistan along with the U.N. agencies and the PVOs. Therefore, if the effort is to succeed, the Coordinator's Office must also have a strong and continuous representation in Pakistan with widely recognized organizational integrity.

Finally, there is not yet sufficient cohesion among the specialized U.N. agencies and many continue to prefer a lead agency rather than a single coordinator approach. The individual U.N. agencies have, in varying degrees, tended to follow their specialized tracks to create ambitious "full-service" schemes focussing on the mandate of the particular agency (i.e., WFP- feeding; WHO- health; UNICEF- immunization and maternal and child health; UNDP- general development; FAO- agriculture; UNHCR- resettlement with something of several other agencies' concerns). Closer coordination has been exhibited by those agencies (UNHCR, WFP) involved in the initial.

resettlement phase, with lesser cooperation by those organizations traditionally engaged in longer-term development activities. The efforts of the Coordinator to bring discipline to the respective agencies individually and collectively need to be greatly strengthened.

3. A.I.D. Coordination with the U.N. and Other Donors

The Office of the A.I.D. Representative and the contractors associated with the program have spent countless hours meeting with U.N. staff from the Coordinator's office and from the various U.N. agencies. Information and experience have been shared and advice has been offered. It is apparent, however, that A.I.D. and the U.N. must more actively coordinate their programs--with appropriate GOP input. To encourage further cooperation, A.I.D. has adopted an approach of advice, support, and collaboration.

The Mission has provided advice to the U.N. agencies on both policy and technical issues since the signing of the Geneva Accords, and even before to UNICEF as it sought to collaborate with the Alliance Health Committee on immunization. Early on, the Mission highlighted the problem of mines and facilitated the mobilization of U.S. Department of Defense personnel to assist the Office of the Coordinator in addressing this problem. Currently, the A.I.D. Representative and his staff are counseling the U.N. agencies to establish a more positive relationship with the Government of Pakistan and the Alliance, and to be more active in seeking Afghan input into U.N. plans and operations.

In addition to advice, the Mission has provided and will continue to provide direct support to the U.N. agencies. To date, such support has included, among other things, successfully intervening with the Government of Pakistan to obtain clearance for the U.N. survey missions to enter Afghanistan from Pakistan; providing the services of a highly qualified wheat expert to work with the FAO on seed issues; and consideration of a grant to increase the operational efficiency of the Coordinator's Office in Pakistan. Support of this nature will continue to the extent resources permit.

Finally, the Mission will actively collaborate on selected activities with the U.N. agencies. This is already taking place.

A.I.D.-financed technical committees for education and health will

assist in adapting some awareness training materials that will be shared with the Coordinator's Office. UNICEF is collaborating with the Alliance Health Committee on a cross border immunization program. Moreover, A.I.D. is collaborating with the World Food Program to help develop its capacity to distribute wheat inside Afghanistan. Eventually, it is expected that the WFP will assume the entire responsibility for in-country emergency feeding programs. If all goes well, FY 1989 will be the transition year. A.I.D., after that point, will concentrate on CARE-managed food for work and possibly MCH programs. It is planned that CARE will also assist with WFP activities. This should further ensure the complementarity of A.I.D. and the WFP.

As mentioned previously, an opportunity exists for some type of association or direct relationship between the A.I.D.-financed Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit and UNILOG, the joint logistics office of UNHCR and WFP. General discussions have taken place on this subject with representatives from the U.N. Coordinator's Office in Pakistan, and WFP and UNHCR officials in Washington and Geneva respectively.

A.I.D. will continue to meet with UNHCR to determine how the Commodity Export Program might be used to help fill critical commodity gaps for which the UNHCR cannot easily or quickly respond. Discussions will also consider pre-positioning of commodities and plans for delivery and distribution.

Key benchmarks against which the progress of A.I.D.-U.N. collaboration can be measured follow:

- By December 30, 1988, A.I.D. and UNHCR will have completed discussions on commodity procurement to determine to what extent A.I.D. assistance may be required in filling critical gaps. Meetings will be held regularly thereafter to discuss on-going issues.
- By February 15, 1989, A.I.D. and UNILOG will have determined an appropriate relationship between UNILOG and the ACLU.
- By April 15, 1988, A.I.D. and UNICEF will have completed plans for moving from the pilot immunization activity into a larger-scale campaign.

By September 30, 1989, with A.I.D. and CARE help, the WFP will have established a viable emergency feeding program inside Afghanistan and plans for a coordinated A.I.D.-WFP food for work effort will be completed.

13. Management Implications

In management exercises, it is useful to compare the ratio of OYB levels to staff levels in A.I.D. missions. Most missions in the Asia Near East region manage an estimated \$500,000 to \$2,000,000 for every U.S. direct hire employee. The exceptions are Egypt, Pakistan, and the Philippines--all of which have large balance of payments and/or a number of capital intensive projects--and Afghanistan.

The cross border program, which has one of the most staff intensive portfolios in the Agency, has a planned Operational Year Budget of \$68 million in FY 1989, excluding PL 480 and DOD resources. Unless staff levels are increased, the responsibility for managing those resources will rest with 12 U.S. direct-hire employees. The ratio of OYB to staff will be more than \$5.5 million for every U.S. direct-hire employee. (The calculation does not include one full time and one part time resident direct-hire secretaries.)

In addition to the \$68 million OYB, the Mission will manage a 60,000 metric ton PL 480 Title II food aid program (which could increase with the addition of a Title II CARE-managed food for work program and a Section 206 Sales Program) and the in-Pakistan aspects of a \$10 million Department of Defense Humanitarian Relief Program. Moreover, the Mission has been encouraged in State 325129 "to ensure that the UNHCR and other U.N. agency planning is comprehensive, cost effective, and logistically and financially realistic."

Coordination with the United Nations, other potential donors, and PVOs has been extremely time consuming and is certain to become increasingly so as A.I.D. involves itself more actively with resettlement. The time element is not only a function of the enormity of the resettlement effort, it is also related to the number of U.N. agencies with which A.I.D. must interact. The list includes the Office of the U.N. Coordinator; the operational agencies of the UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, and the WFP; and the newly created

Logistics organization, UNHCR. Eventually, other organizations, such as UNESCO and ILO may become more active.

In order to cooperate effectively with the U.N. and other donors and, at the same time, responsibly manage and oversee an increasingly complex portfolio, the Mission proposed the approval of seven additional direct-hire positions in a memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Asia Near East Bureau dated September 3, 1988. Four of the seven positions are needed immediately (Project Development Officer, Supervisory General Development Officer, Program Economist, and Education Project Officer). The Food for Peace Officer is now with the Embassy Refugee Office and should be transferred to A.I.D. soon, but no later than when a significant movement of the refugees begins. The Executive Officer and Project Officer (Agriculture) positions should be authorized but recruitment can await further developments, i.e., an anticipated shift of the Office to kabul for the former and a redesigned and approved agriculture portfolio for the latter.

To further bolster staff resources, the Mission will more actively integrate the Embassy Refugee Office in A.I.D. activities.

V. BUDGET PLAN

Congress earmarked \$22.5 million of Economic Support Funds, \$22.5 million of Development Assistance Funds, and not less than \$23 million from the Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance account for the FY 1989 A.I.D. Cross Border Humanitarian Assistance Program. The following chart indicates how A.I.D. intends to allocate the FY 1989 funds. FY 1988 and proposed FY 1990 budgets are also shown.

TABLE 4

A.I.D. BUDGET: FY 1988 - FY 1990

<u>Project Number & Titles</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	
		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
306-0200 Tech Serv. & Spt.	1,170,274	1,000,000	1,000,000
306-0201 PVO Co-Financing	6,625,900	7,000,000	7,000,000
306-0202 Edu. Sector Spt.	6,350,000	7,000,000	8,000,000
306-0203 Health Sector Spt.	7,200,000	14,000,000	15,000,000
306-0204 Ag. Sector Spt.	4,500,000	16,000,000	18,000,000
306-0205 Commodity Export	16,200,000	16,000,000	14,000,000
306-0208 Rural Assistance	3,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000
TOTAL	<u>45,046,174</u>	<u>62,000,000</u>	<u>70,000,000</u>

Resources in FY 89 and FY 90 are tilted to favor resettlement and rehabilitation activities. Funds set aside for the Agriculture Sector Support Project quadruple from \$4,500,000 in FY 1988 to \$18,000,000 in FY 1990, while Rural Assistance, a project that provides assistance through PVOs to support increased agricultural production as well as resettlement jumps from \$3,000,000 to \$7,000,000. Over the same time period, the Health Sector Support Project, which will promote immunization and the control of diarrhea diseases, more than doubles from \$7,200,000 to \$15,000,000. The Commodity Export Program will continue to provide critical commodity, logistics and transportation support during the resettlement period at the relatively high levels of \$16 million in FY 89 and \$14 million in FY 90. Budgets for those projects that are not directly related to the resettlement--Technical Services and Support, and Education Sector Support--stabilize at close to the FY 1988 level.

As the resettlement begins and donors get a better fix on needs, the planning levels for individual projects may change. To accommodate a possible fluid funding situation in this and subsequent fiscal years, as well as a host of unknowns respecting U.N. and other donor efforts, existing and new projects are being redesigned and designed to permit pre-planned expansion or contraction.

A.I.D. also has a PL 480 Title II food program for Afghanistan and handles the in-Pakistan aspects of the Department of Defense Humanitarian Relief Program. The following chart shows the total assistance provided through A.I.D., as well as the humanitarian relief assistance provided by DOD and the refugee assistance provided by the Department of State Refugee Program Office.

TABLE 5

U.S. Government Contributions
To Afghan Humanitarian Assistance
(\$ million)

	<u>FY 1986*</u>	<u>FY 1987*</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
1. <u>Cross Border Humanitarian Assistance Program</u>				
A. <u>A.I.D. Assistance</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>30.0</u>	<u>45.0</u>	<u>68.0</u>
Health Sector Asst.	(3.5)	(5.0)	(7.2)	(14.0)
Educ. Sector Asst.	(1.1)	(3.0)	(6.35)	(7.0)
Agr. Sector Support	-	(1.5)	(4.5)	(16.0)
Commodity Exp. Prog.	(3.8)	(10.1)	(16.2)	(16.0)
PVO Co-financing	(9.4)	(9.1)	(6.6)	(7.0)
Rural Sector Asst.			(3.0)	(7.0)
LSIA Afghan Media Proj.		(0.6)		
Tech. Serv. & Spt.	(0.5)	(0.6)	(1.17)	(1.0)
B. <u>PL 480 Title II</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Commodities	(8.9)	(2.6)	(7.5)	(10.1)
Ocean Freight	(n/a)	(n/a)	(4.5)	(4.5)
Transportation Grant			(6.0)	(3.0)
WFP Wheat				(9.0)
C. <u>Humanitarian Relief</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.0</u>
<u>(McCollum Prog.)</u>				
Patient Placement and other				
A.I.D. incurred Costs	(0.3)	(2.0)	(2.8)	(n/a)
International Transportation,				
Support, and Other USD				
Incurred Costs (est.)	(2.7)	(7.5)	(7.5)	(n/a)
2. <u>On-going Refugee Program in Pakistan</u>				
	<u>49.55</u>	<u>67.9</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>38.0</u>
A. UNHCR	(18.97)	(21.6)	(16.0)	(20.0)
B. WFP	(25.28)	(37.5)	(33.0)	(18.0)**
C. WFP for CY 1989			(16.7)	
D. Volags & other	(5.30)	(8.8)	(3.0)	(n/a)
TOTAL	<u>89.75</u>	<u>110.0</u>	<u>142.0</u>	<u>132.6</u>

* Ocean freight not included.

** Estimate.

There are both budget and financial issues that A.I.D. must address in the coming fiscal year. The budget issue relates to gaining rapid access to the \$23 million from the Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance account. The EOMA legislation requires that the \$45 million earmarked for Afghanistan in the A.I.D. legislation must be obligated before the \$23 million of EOMA funds can be made available. Washington needs to quickly address any further conditions to the release of the EOMA funds so that these funds can be put to use as soon as possible.

Obligation of the \$45 million must be rapid, especially for those projects being amended and for which contracts must be competed. It is known already that three contracts must be let under the Commodity Export Program. Contracting decisions have yet to be made for the Education and Agriculture Sector Support projects. Washington assistance will be needed to ensure that the \$45 million is available for obligation at the earliest possible date and to accelerate the review and authorization amendments for the redesigned projects.

There is a financial issue that has critical implications for A.I.D. as well as the resistance or any eventual successor government, and, shortly, the U.N. and other donors. In the narrow sense, the issue is the inability for the foreseeable future for Afghanistan to absorb the recurrent costs of the schools, clinics, and the agriculture/rural works activities established with A.I.D. assistance. In the broader sense, the issue is the inability of the resistance or a successor government to self-finance even the most basic of public goods and services until a revenue generating capacity can be created in Kabul.

The Mission has asked the redesign teams to explore the issue of recurrent costs and the possibility of collecting fees for services or introducing other measures to enhance self-sustainability. It is possible that other donors may be willing to finance some elements of the A.I.D. projects, including recurrent costs or, alternatively, spin-offs from the A.I.D. projects. The Mission proposed approaching other donors in Islamabad 16078 dated August 1, 1988. The idea was put in abeyance until after the U.N. pledging conference on October 12, 1988, to avoid the appearance of competing with the U.N. for donor resources. A decision to approach other donors can now be taken and demarches made in targetted capitals around the world.

At the same time, the Government should be encouraged, to the extent possible, to develop its own resources and other resource allocation decisions should be simplified as much as possible to legitimate Afghan authorities. Consequently, among the most important activities will be those which generate revenues for a free Government of Afghanistan. In this regard, A.I.D. is considering a small commodity import program, a Section 206 food aid program, and other revenue generating initiatives e.g., fees for services.

VI. Conclusion

The strategy is an ambitious one; but then the strategy at the start of the program was not modest. Few would have predicted in 1985 the achievements that are widely acknowledged today.

To meet the objectives of the strategy will require a joint effort between the Mission and Washington. Washington assistance will be particularly important in ensuring the rapid review and approval of Mission documents, the authorization and recruitment of the requested additional staff members, and the early release of the Congressionally authorized program funds. Washington is also invited to play a broader role in the dialogue with the United Nations and the other donors. Finally, it may be time for Washington to review the policy of restricting the travel of U.S. citizens inside Afghanistan.

The donors must be prepared when the refugees begin to move. Plans and mechanisms that are in place at that time can be adjusted as the situation dictates but it will be difficult to compensate quickly and effectively for plans and mechanisms not in place. The importance of pushing hard now cannot be over-emphasized. The A.I.D. program was accorded high priority during the war. It deserves the same during the transition to peace.